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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In a previous article, we identified “anti-evasion doctrines” (AEDs) 
that the U.S. Supreme Court develops in various areas of constitu-
tional law to prevent the circumvention of constitutional principles 
the Court has sought to enforce.1 In many cases, we observed that 
AEDs were developed to backstop decision rules2 that were designed 
as rules, and that the AEDs performed this function by taking the 
form of standards.3 Canvassing the benefits and tradeoffs of optimiz-
 * Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. 
 ** Associate Professor, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University. 
The authors thank Lou Virelli and participants at a University of Tennessee College of 
Law Faculty Forum for helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions, especially Dwight 
Aarons, Ben Barton, Amy Hess, Gary Pulsinelli, John Sobieski, Greg Stein, and David 
Wolitz. John Harrison deserves special thanks for encouraging us to explore this topic. 
Irena Chernova and Rich Fillmore provided valuable research assistance. 
 1. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitu-
tional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773. 
 2. “Decision rules” are those doctrines the Court develops to “implement” constitu-
tional principles, or what Mitch Berman calls “constitutional operative propositions.” See 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004). For “im-
plementation” of the Constitution through decision rules, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
 3. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1779-96. 
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ing constitutional principles by using AEDs, we concluded that they 
were likely worth the costs in additional complexity and possible in-
crease in decision costs to judges.4 
 But the Court’s use of AEDs is not foreordained. In this Article, we 
take up the phenomenon of anti-anti-evasion, in which the Court de-
clines to design AEDs to prevent alleged evasions of constitutional 
principle. As was true of AEDs, examples can be found across consti-
tutional law. In this Article, we identify a number of occasions in 
which the Court engages in anti-anti-evasion, then seek to under-
stand the reasons why it does so. In the end, we hope to shed light on 
the practice of anti-anti-evasion, as well as to illuminate our earlier 
study with a working hypothesis of when the Court will and when it 
will not backstop its decisions with subsequent AEDs. 
 Part II provides a brief overview of our theory of AEDs. Part III 
furnishes several examples of anti-anti-evasion from constitutional 
law. Part IV discusses the types of reasons given by the Court when it 
declines the invitation to create AEDs, which we argue are not suffi-
cient to explain fully the decision to engage in anti-anti-evasion. Ac-
cordingly, Part V includes our working hypothesis that the Court will 
not create AEDs where it believes that the constitutional principle is 
adequately protected by robust political safeguards—primarily in 
cases involving taxing or spending decisions, including the provision 
of government-subsidized goods and services. Our hypothesis is par-
tially confirmed, moreover, by the Court’s resolution of the constitu-
tional issues surrounding the Affordable Care Act in the much-awaited 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius5 (NFIB) case, 
which we also discuss in Part V. A brief conclusion follows. 
II.   AN OVERVIEW OF AEDS 
 Our prior work identified a pattern in the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence that we termed “anti-evasion doctrines.” In numerous 
and varied areas of constitutional doctrine, the Court initially im-
plements a constitutional principle via a decision rule that typically 
resembles an ex ante rule.6 That decision rule, in turn, is bolstered or 
backstopped by a subsequent AED—that is, by a later decision rule 
that is designed to prevent circumvention of the constitutional prin-
ciple through formal compliance with the earlier decision rule.7 Just 
 4. Id. at 1796-1815. 
 5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 6. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1793. 
 7. Id. 
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as the initial decision rule tends to take the form of a rule, the AED 
tends to be formulated as an ex post standard.8 
 AEDs tend to be one of four types of constitutional “tests.” First, 
they occur as “pretext tests,” asking whether government is, under 
the guise of a constitutionally permissible objective, actually attempt-
ing to regulate in a manner that the Constitution proscribes.9 Second, 
they take the form of “proxy tests,” which ferret out regulations that 
depend on a purportedly neutral characteristic, but in reality use 
that characteristic as a proxy for some other, prohibited characteris-
tic.10 Third, AEDs are packaged as “purpose tests” that ask whether 
the law has been “developed or applied for constitutionally illegiti-
mate reasons.”11 Finally, AEDs occur as “effects tests” that focus on 
the effects of a regulation rather than its explicit content.12 
 Although each of these tests has a slightly different emphasis, as 
AEDs, they share a common doctrinal purpose—i.e., to prevent indi-
rect violations of a constitutional principle through formal compli-
ance with the Court’s decision rules.13 Put differently, AEDs attempt 
to optimize constitutional enforcement by ensuring that governmen-
tal officials cannot easily evade or undermine constitutional com-
mands by manipulating gaps left open in the decision rules developed 
to implement those commands.14 Despite their utility and ubiquity, 
however, the Court does not employ AEDs in every circumstance. No-
table areas of constitutional doctrine exist where the Court has de-
clined to create or develop an AED, raising the question with which 
this Article primarily is concerned: What does it mean when the 
Court engages in such anti-anti-evasion? 
III.   EXAMPLES OF ANTI-ANTI-EVASION 
 When we use the term anti-anti-evasion, we mean to describe a 
situation characterized by the following pattern. At Time T, the Court 
enforces a constitutional principle by articulating certain decision 
 8. Id. at 1780-93 (offering examples). As we noted in our previous article, we think 
this is the typical pattern revealed in the Court’s decisions. But this is not to say that the 
pattern holds in every instance where an AED is employed. Some AEDs may take more 
rule-like form to backstop standard-like decision rules, and there are circumstances where 
the AEDs are pronounced simultaneously with the primary decision rule. Id. at 1793 n.159. 
 9. Id. at 1780-84. With the exception of the “proxy test” discussed below, we borrow 
the terminology for these anti-evasion doctrines from Richard Fallon. See FALLON, supra 
note 2, at 77-79 (describing the following doctrinal tests: (1) “forbidden-content tests”; (2) 
“suspect-content test”; (3) “balancing tests”; (4) “non-suspect-content tests”; (5) “effects 
tests”; (6) “purpose tests”; and (7) “appropriate deliberation tests”). 
 10. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1784-88. 
 11. Id. at 1780 (quoting FALLON, supra note 2, at 79); id. at 1788-93. 
 12. Id. at 1780, 1788-93. 
 13. Id. at 1793. 
 14. Id. at 1796. 
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rules that other judicial actors will follow in subsequent cases. Then, 
at Time T1, the Court is presented with a case in which the form of 
the prior rules is observed, but the regulation at issue nonetheless is 
alleged to subvert the substance of the constitutional principle those 
prior rules were supposed to implement. This alleged subversion pre-
sents the Court with an opportunity to create an AED, but the Court 
refuses to do so, judging the challenged regulation to satisfy the Con-
stitution’s requirements. As we demonstrate in this Part, the Court 
engages in anti-anti-evasion with some regularity both in cases in-
volving structural limitations on the power of federal and state gov-
ernments, as well as those involving claims of individual rights.15 
A.   Anti-Anti-Evasion in Structure and Powers Cases 
 1.   The Spending Power 
 South Dakota v. Dole suggested that the Court would invalidate 
conditional spending requirements that were so onerous as to be con-
sidered “coercive.”16 Until NFIB v. Sebelius,17 however, neither the 
Court nor the lower courts had applied that suggestion so as to create 
a full-fledged AED.18 Indeed, in a recent case19 involving a federal 
statute “proscribing bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of enti-
ties that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds,”20 the Court de-
clined to flesh out the “coercion” exception and found the law to be a 
valid exercise of Congress’s power to impose conditions on the receipt 
of federal funds. In response to the defendant’s argument that the 
penalties were “unduly coercive, and impermissibly sweeping, condi-
tion[s] on the grant of federal funds,”21 the Court responded that the 
bribery statute was “authority to bring federal power to bear directly 
 15. As was true of the examples of anti-evasion doctrines in our earlier article, Den-
ning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1779-93, we make no claim that our examples here exhaust 
the universe of anti-anti-evasion decisions by the Court. Additionally, we do not mean to 
say that every instance of anti-anti-evasion follows the above-described pattern in precise 
detail. 
 16. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have recog-
nized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” (citation omitted)); 
Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1783-84 (noting that Dole suggested a type of AED). 
 17. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 18. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 288-90 
(4th Cir. 2002) (discussing judicial treatment of coercion theory); see also Lynn A. Baker & 
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending 
Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 467-
68 (2003) (noting that Dole’s coercion test has not fulfilled its promise and that “lower 
courts have consistently failed to find impermissible coercion”). 
 19. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 20. Id. at 602 (summarizing 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)). 
 21. Id. at 608. 
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on individuals who convert public spending into unearned private 
gain, not a means for bringing federal economic might to bear on a 
State’s own choices of public policy.”22 In NFIB, however, seven mem-
bers of the Court fleshed out the “coercion” language of Dole, holding 
that because the Affordable Care Act radically expanded Medicaid’s 
coverage—to the point of fundamentally remaking the program—
Congress could not penalize states’ refusal to participate in the new 
program by withholding all Medicaid funds, including those for the 
existing program.23 We explore the significance of the Court’s imple-
mentation of an AED after years of anti-anti-evasion in spending  
cases below.24 
 2.   The Copyright Clause 
 In Eldred v. Ashcroft,25 challengers argued that the Copyright 
Term Extension Act, which lengthened by twenty years the term of 
existing and future copyrights in the United States, violated Con-
gress’s Article I, Section 8 power to create copyrights for “limited 
Times.”26 For existing works, the plaintiffs argued, “[t]he ‘limited 
Tim[e]’ in effect when a copyright is secured . . . becomes the constitu-
tional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to ex-
tend.”27 Alternatively, they argued that extensions of existing copy-
rights should be subject to a heightened standard of review to ensure 
that they conformed to the purposes of the Clause.28  
 Relying on “[t]ext, history, and precedent,”29 the Court rejected 
these arguments. First, the Court concluded that nothing about the 
word “limited” prevented the copyright extension from being applied 
to existing copyrights.30 Second, “[h]istory reveals an unbroken con-
gressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copy-
rights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright pro-
tection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”31 The 
Court concluded that “the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not 
at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy 
 22. Id.  
 23.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-06 (2012) 
(opinion of Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. 
 27. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. 
 28. Id. at 218. 
 29. Id. at 199. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 200. 
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judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they 
may be.”32  
 Significantly, for our purposes, the Court rejected the petitioners’ 
argument that “permitting Congress to extend existing copyrights 
allows it to evade the ‘limited Times’ constraint by creating effectively 
perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions.”33 According to the 
Court, the petitioners failed to produce evidence that the retroactive 
extension was motivated by a desire to create, or had the effect of cre-
ating, a perpetual copyright.34 
 3.   The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Subsidies 
 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) describes the 
judge-made rules inferred from the Constitution’s grant of authority 
over interstate commerce to Congress. The DCCD prohibits state and 
local governments from, with a few exceptions, discriminating against 
or otherwise unduly burdening interstate and foreign commerce.35 
States may not, for example, grant a tax credit to incentivize in-state 
production of a commodity, but disallow the credit when production 
occurs outside the state.36 However, the Court has never held that a 
discriminatory cash subsidy—which has an identical economic ef-
fect—violates the DCCD.37 When a discriminatory tax credit in Maine 
was challenged,38 the town seeking to preserve the exemption argued 
 32. Id. at 208. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 199-200 (“[T]here is no cause to suspect that a purpose to evade the ‘limited 
Times’ prescription prompted Congress to adopt the CTEA.”); id. at 209-10 (“Critically, we 
again emphasize, petitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally signifi-
cant threshold with respect to ‘limited Times’ that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not.”). 
But see id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The economic effect of this 20-year extension—
the longest blanket extension since the Nation’s founding—is to make the copyright term 
not limited, but virtually perpetual.”). Justice Breyer went on to suggest that while Con-
gress might not have intended to act unconstitutionally, it might have intended to test the 
limits of its power, a tendency that AEDs can deter. Compare id. at 256, with Denning & 
Kent, supra note 1, at 1802 (suggesting that AEDs can raise costs to official actors seeking 
to regulate to the very limit of their power by blurring the lines separating permissible 
from impermissible actions). 
 35. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008). 
 36. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
 37. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) (“We 
have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so 
now. We have, however, noted that ‘[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not 
ordinarily run afoul’ of the negative Commerce Clause.” (citations omitted)); see also infra 
notes 76-91 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s refusal to treat tax expenditures as 
the equivalent of direct public support for religion). See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business 
Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998) (discussing analy-
sis of subsidies under the DCCD). 
 38. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). Maine 
exempted from property taxes charities that primarily benefitted Maine citizens. Id. at 567.  
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that it was economically indistinguishable from a cash subsidy and 
should be treated the same way.39 The Court declined this invitation 
for similar treatment, in part on the strength of precedent that start-
ed from “the premise that there is a constitutionally significant dif-
ference between subsidies and tax exemptions.”40 
 4.   Use Taxes 
 Before the Court’s decision in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady41 
rationalized the Court’s DCCD tax jurisprudence, a welter of quite 
formal rules determined the constitutionality of state and local tax-
es.42 One of the rules was that states may not tax interstate com-
merce qua interstate commerce.43 When Washington sought to offset 
the loss of revenue from goods purchased out-of-state, yet used in 
Washington, by imposing a corresponding “use” tax on the privilege of 
using goods bought elsewhere, challengers argued that the tax was 
really a tax on interstate commerce itself, motivated by a desire to 
create a protective tariff on goods imported into the state.44 For the 
Court, Justice Cardozo rejected those arguments. First, he accepted 
Washington’s argument that it was not imposing a tax on the sale of 
the item, but merely its use within the state. Citing a number of cas-
es, he wrote that “[t]hings acquired or transported in interstate com-
merce may be subjected to a property tax, non-discriminatory in its 
operation, when they have become part of the common mass of prop-
erty within the state of destination.”45 Moreover, noting the credit 
Washington gave for any sales tax paid on the purchase, Cardozo ob-
served that the same amount of tax was levied on interstate sales as 
on intrastate sales.46 
 To the argument that “a tax upon the use, even though not unlaw-
ful by force of its effects alone, is vitiated by the motives that led to  
its adoption,” which “cause it to be stigmatized as equivalent to a  
protective tariff,”47 Cardozo had two responses. First, he noted that 
impermissible motive alone is usually insufficient to invalidate an 
 39. Id. at 589. 
 40. Id. at 590. 
 41. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 42. For an overview, see 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. 
SWAIN, STATE TAXATION ¶¶ 4.01-4.13 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2012). 
 43. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946). 
 44. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582-83, 586 (1937). 
 45. Id. at 582. 
 46. Id. at 584. Again, the Court noted that similar taxes had been upheld in a variety 
of other circumstances. Id. at 585 (citing cases regarding taxes that equally affect inter-
state and intrastate sales). 
 47. Id. at 586. 
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otherwise valid measure.48 Second, he argued that the use tax was 
truly laid on property imported then placed into use, as opposed to 
property merely imported. This was a distinction with a difference,  
he maintained: 
Catch words and labels, such as the words “protective tariff,” are 
subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors and symbols, and 
must be watched with circumspection lest they put us off our 
guard. A tariff, whether protective or for revenue, burdens the very 
act of importation, and if laid by a state upon its commerce with 
another is equally unlawful whether protection or revenue is the 
motive back of it. But a tax upon use, or, what is equivalent for 
present purposes, a tax upon property after importation is over, is 
not a clog upon the process of importation at all, any more than a 
tax upon the income or profits of a business.49 
 Current doctrine permits “compensatory taxes” placed on out-of-
state, but not in-state, goods, in order to compensate for taxes paid by 
the latter, but not by the former.50 The use tax is the paradigmatic 
compensatory tax; few other taxes claimed to be compensatory have 
survived judicial review.51 
 5.   The Import-Export Clause 
 Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the Constitution prohibits states 
from laying “imposts or duties” on “imports or exports” without con-
gressional consent, save for those “absolutely necessary” for carrying 
out inspection laws. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court 
held52—probably incorrectly53—that the Clause applied only to for-
eign imports and exports.54 Before Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages55 was 
decided in 1976, the rule was that taxes could not be imposed on im-
ported goods until they ceased to be “imports,” which was held to be 
the point at which goods were taken out of their “original package” 
and commingled with other property at rest in the taxing jurisdic-
tion.56 The Michelin Tire case overturned more than a century of case 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 42, ¶ 4.14[3][c][i]. 
 51. Id. ¶ 4.14[3][c][ii] (“The Court’s most recent encounters with the ‘complementary’ 
or ‘compensatory’ tax doctrine continue its modern trend of evaluating states’ ‘complemen-
tary tax’ arguments with considerable skepticism.”). 
 52. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 136 (1868). 
 53. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621-37 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-Export 
Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155 (1999). 
 54. Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 136. 
 55. 423 U.S. 276 (1976); see generally Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wag-
es: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 99. 
 56. See generally HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 42, ¶ 5.01. 
                                                                                                                  
2014]  ANTI-ANTI-EVASION 405 
 
law and held that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on 
imported property present in the taxing jurisdiction on tax day did 
not violate any of the general goals of the Import-Export Clause.57 
While admitting that the Clause did not distinguish between discrim-
inatory and nondiscriminatory imposts and duties,58 the Court re-
fused to read “imposts and duties” broadly to encompass the taxes at 
issue in the case.59 The Court pointed out that “the Clause is not writ-
ten in terms of a broad prohibition of every ‘tax.’ ”60 It contrasted the 
specific language of Article I, Section 10, with the broader language of 
Article I, Section 8, which authorized Congress “to ‘lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises.’ ”61 The Court concluded:  
[S]ince prohibition of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxa-
tion would not further the objectives of the Import-Export Clause, 
only the clearest constitutional mandate should lead us to con-
demn such taxation. The terminology employed in the Clause—
“Imposts or Duties”—is sufficiently ambiguous that we decline to 
presume it was intended to embrace taxation that does not create 
the evils the Clause was specifically intended to eliminate.62 
 6.   The Commerce Clause 
 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”63 In the late 1930s, the Court began taking 
an expansive view of those activities that qualify as interstate com-
merce. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., for example, the 
Court recognized that Congress possesses the authority to regulate 
seemingly intrastate activity that has “a close and substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce.”64 Similarly, in United States v. Darby, 
 57. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285-86. The Court described these three goals as follows: 
[1] [T]he Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating 
commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect 
foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that 
exclusive power; [2] import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of 
the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and [3] har-
mony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with their 
crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of other 
States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States 
not situated as favorably geographically.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 58. Id. at 290. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. at 293-94. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 64. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
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the Court held that “[t]he power of Congress over interstate com-
merce . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect inter-
state commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end . . . .”65  
 In Darby, the Court utilized this view of the Commerce Clause to 
uphold Congress’s authority to regulate labor conditions via the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).66 When initially enacted, the FLSA 
was applicable only to private economic activity, specifically exclud-
ing state and local government employers from its provisions.67 Over 
time, however, Congress amended the statute so that it eventually 
applied to state and local governments as well.68 In National League 
of Cities v. Usery, the Court struck down the amendments on the 
ground that they violated state sovereignty and were thus outside 
the scope of the Commerce Clause power.69 
 Although not explicit in its decision, the Court in Usery seemed 
concerned that Congress was utilizing the Court’s prior decision rules 
implementing the Commerce Clause in a way that enabled evasion of 
other constitutional principles. Through its amendments to the 
FLSA, Congress was impermissibly regulating the states and their 
political subdivisions under the pretext of regulating commercial ac-
tivity.70 To curb such evasion, the Court established a decision rule 
that prohibited Congress from using its admittedly plenary Com-
merce Clause power “to force directly upon the States its choices as to 
how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmen-
tal functions are to be made.”71 As applied by subsequent decisions, 
Usery thus created a standard-like balancing test focusing on the 
type of federal regulation, the state/local function involved, and the 
interests of both sovereigns.72 This test can be viewed, in other words, 
as a type of AED. 
 65. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). 
 66. Id. at 121-26. 
 67. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836 (1976) (discussing history of 
the FLSA). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 851-52. 
 70. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 562 (1985) (Powell, 
J., dissenting) (reading Usery as establishing a rule “for determining whether Commerce 
Clause enactments transgress [i.e., evade] constitutional limitations imposed by the federal 
nature of our system of government”). 
 71. Usery, 426 U.S. at 855. 
 72. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981); 
see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 561-63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing Usery as standard-
like balancing test); Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (indicating that 
Usery employed “balancing approach”). 
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 Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Ass’n, the Court was presented with another opportunity to reaffirm 
the AED-like decision rule from Usery. Instead, the Court explicitly 
overruled Usery.73 The majority found that the Usery framework was 
not only unworkable, but it was inconsistent with the respective 
competencies of the legislative and judicial branches.74 Without deny-
ing that Congress might attempt to push the bounds of its regulatory 
powers, the Court now indicated that the chief means of protecting 
the states lay in the structure and process of the federal political sys-
tem, rather than in the courts. “[W]e are convinced,” wrote Justice 
Blackmun for the Court, “that the fundamental limitation . . . on the 
Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is one of process 
rather than one of result.”75 
B.   Anti-Anti-Evasion in Individual Rights and Liberties Cases 
 1.   The Establishment Clause 
 Minnesota allowed parents to deduct certain educational expenses 
on their state taxes. The deduction was available whether the chil-
dren attended public or private schools. Because parents whose chil-
dren attended private, sectarian schools benefitted disproportionate-
ly, the deduction was challenged as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.76 Central to the challenge was the argument that, despite the 
deduction’s facial neutrality, the primary beneficiaries of the deduc-
tion were religious schools, because public education was provided 
free of charge.77 Upholding the tax deduction,78 then-Justice Rehn-
quist wrote that “[w]e need not consider [the establishment-in-effect 
argument] in detail.”79 He continued: 
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality 
of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to 
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the 
law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that 
this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled stand-
ards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated. More-
 73. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (majority opinion). 
 74. Id. at 538-47. 
 75. Id. at 554. 
 76. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1983). 
 77. Id. at 400-01. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
the Court invalidated a similar New York law that provided tax relief to parents of paro-
chial school students alone. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 78. The Court concluded that the deduction had a secular purpose, did not impermis-
sibly advance religion, and did not excessively entangle the state with religion. Mueller, 
463 U.S. at 394-400 (applying the prongs of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
 79. Id. at 401. 
                                                                                                                  
408  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:397 
 
over, the fact that private persons fail in a particular year to claim 
the tax relief to which they are entitled—under a facially neutral 
statute—should be of little importance in determining the consti-
tutionality of the statute permitting such relief.80 
 In a more recent case, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organiza-
tion v. Winn,81 the Court held that Arizona taxpayers lacked standing 
to challenge a state law permitting a tax deduction for contributions 
to private school tuition organizations that provided scholarships for 
students to attend secular and sectarian private schools in the state.82 
Under federal law, taxpayers generally don’t have standing to chal-
lenge governmental action.83 An exception was created in Flast v. Co-
hen for taxpayer challenges to government expenditures alleged to 
violate the Establishment Clause.84 As the Winn Court explained, 
Flast requires the satisfaction of two conditions for such taxpayer 
standing. First, “there must be a ‘logical link’ between the plaintiff’s 
taxpayer status ‘and the type of legislative enactment attacked.’ ”85 
Second, “there must be ‘a nexus’ between the plaintiff’s taxpayer sta-
tus and ‘the precise nature of the constitutional infringement al-
leged.’ ”86 In Flast, the latter condition was satisfied by an “allegation 
that Government funds had been spent on an outlay for religion in 
contravention of the Establishment Clause.”87 Flast’s exception, how-
ever, has been narrowed nearly to the vanishing point, and the Winn 
Court was not inclined to reverse this narrowing. 
 Petitioners argued that the tax credit was akin to direct govern-
mental spending and that they should be deemed to have standing to 
challenge the deduction.88 “A dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extract-
ed and spent,’ ” explained Justice Kennedy, “knows that he has in 
some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment in 
violation of conscience.”89 By contrast,  
[w]hen the government declines to impose a tax . . . there is no 
such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged estab-
lishment. Any financial injury remains speculative. And awarding 
 80. Id. 
 81. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 82. Id. at 1440. 
83. See generally 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3531.10 (3d ed. & Supp. 2008) (describing citizen suits). 
 84. 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). 
 85. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1445 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102). 
 86. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1447. 
 89. Id. 
                                                                                                                  
2014]  ANTI-ANTI-EVASION 409 
 
some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to retain control 
over their own funds in accordance with their own consciences.90 
Justice Kennedy thus concluded that “[w]hen Arizona taxpayers 
choose to contribute to [student tuition organizations], they spend 
their own money, not money the State has collected from respondents 
or from other taxpayers.”91 
 Justice Kagan wrote a dissent for herself and three other Justices 
criticizing the majority’s position and arguing that it facilitated naked 
evasion of the taxpayer standing exception created in Flast.92 The ma-
jority’s “novel distinction . . . between appropriations and tax expend-
itures,” she wrote,  
has as little basis in principle as it has in our precedent. Cash 
grants and targeted tax breaks are means of accomplishing the 
same government objective—to provide financial support to select 
individuals or organizations. Taxpayers who oppose state aid of  
religion have equal reason to protest whether that aid flows from 
the one form of subsidy or the other. Either way, the government 
has financed the religious activity. And so either way, taxpayers 
should be able to challenge the subsidy.93 
 2.   Taxes as Takings 
 When Pittsburgh imposed a twenty percent gross receipts tax on 
owners of private parking lots, the owners of the lots sued, alleging 
that the tax destroyed their businesses and thus constituted an un-
compensated taking in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, but the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed.95 First, the Court noted it “ha[d] consistently refused either 
to undertake the task of passing on the ‘reasonableness’ of a tax that 
otherwise is within the power . . . of state legislative authorities, or to 
hold that a tax is unconstitutional because it renders a business un-
profitable.”96 Second, the Court identified problems with the state 
court’s claim that the tax was so high that it amounted to an unlaw-
ful confiscation of property. Not only was such a conclusion reserved 
for “rare and special instances,”97 but the Pennsylvania court itself 
 90. Id. (citation omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. 
 94. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 370-73 (1974). 
 95. Id. at 372-73. 
 96. Id. at 373. 
 97. Id. at 374. 
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had recognized that the tax was going to raise a significant amount  
of revenue.98 
 Similar problems existed with the lower court’s “takings-in-effect” 
argument, which assumed that “a bona fide tax, if sufficiently bur-
densome, could be held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.”99 
The Court found this at odds with “the oft-repeated principle that the 
judiciary should not infer a legislative attempt to exercise a forbidden 
power in the form of a seeming tax from the fact, alone, that the tax 
appears excessive or even so high as to threaten the existence of an 
occupation or business.”100 The Court found no more appealing the 
suggestion that “the ordinance loses its character as a tax . . . if the 
taxing authority, directly or through an instrumentality enjoying var-
ious forms of tax exemption, competes with the taxpayer in a manner 
thought to be unfair by the judiciary.”101 Institutional competence 
counseled against “the judiciary undertak[ing] to separate those taxes 
that are too burdensome from those that are not,” as well as engaging 
in “judicial oversight of the terms and circumstances under which the 
government or its tax-exempt instrumentalities may undertake to 
compete with the private sector.”102 
 The Court’s earlier decision in Leonard v. Earle103 provides an even 
more pointed example of the refusal to second-guess a taxing measure 
on the ground that it is pretext for, or has the same effect as, a tak-
ing. In Leonard, the Court considered a Maryland statute that re-
quired oyster packers to deliver to the state ten percent of the empty 
oyster shells left over after the shucking process. The state planned to 
place the empty shells back into the oyster beds to prevent their de-
struction and aid in their reproduction.104 The empty shells, however, 
had commercial value to the packers, who could sell them for use in 
road-making, fertilizer manufacturing, and chicken feed.105 Thus, the 
plaintiff packer refused to deliver the required shells and challenged 
the statute as effecting an uncompensated taking of its property.106 
 The Court unanimously rejected this challenge. Noting that the 
state undoubtedly could have taxed the packers for a cash equivalent 
to the value of the empty shells, the Court saw no meaningful differ-
ence in the state physically demanding the shells themselves. “[A]s 
 98. Id. at 375 (“It would have been difficult from any standpoint to have held that the 
ordinance was in no sense a revenue measure.”). 
 99. Id. at 376. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 279 U.S. 392 (1929). 
 104. Id. at 393-94. 
 105. Id. at 393. 
 106. Id. at 396. 
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the packer lawfully could be required to pay that sum in money,” 
wrote Justice McReynolds, “we think nothing in the Federal Consti-
tution prevents the State from demanding that he give up the same 
per cent[age] of such shells.”107 This was so for two primary reasons. 
First, the Court viewed the form of the exaction—whether payable in 
cash or in kind—to be of no material difference to the packer: “From 
the packer’s standpoint empty shells are but ordinary articles of 
commerce, desirable because convertible into money.”108 Additionally, 
the Court indicated that the method by which a tax is payable—
including delivery of specific property—was a matter of legislative, 
not judicial, competence: “The extent to which it [the power to tax] 
shall be exercised, the subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and 
the mode in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within the dis-
cretion of the legislatures to which the States commit the exercise of 
the power.”109 
 3.   Racial Discrimination 
 When its public swimming pools were held to discriminate against 
African Americans because they were white-only, the city of Jackson, 
Mississippi transferred ownership of one to the YMCA and closed four 
others.110 The closure was challenged as an attempt to evade a lower 
court’s finding and an attempt to evade the Equal Protection Clause. 
But the Court in Palmer v. Thompson concluded that there was no 
constitutional violation. Responding to the argument that it was the 
intent of the city, in closing the pools, to prevent their integration, the 
Court replied that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative 
act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of 
the men who voted for it.”111 While the Court conceded that there was 
“[s]ome evidence” in the record that the decision to close the pools was 
motivated by “ideological opposition to racial integration in swimming 
pools,”112 there was also evidence that the city concluded that inte-
grated pools could not be operated safely or economically.113 Justice 
Black concluded: 
It is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the “sole”    
or “dominant” motivation behind the choices of a group of legisla-
tors. Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial at-
tempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its sup-
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 397. 
 110. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1971). 
 111. Id. at 224. 
 112. Id. at 224-25. 
 113. Id. at 225. 
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porters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than be-
cause of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as 
soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for 
different reasons.114 
The Court distinguished cases like Gomillion v. Lightfoot on the 
grounds that the primary basis on which those laws were invalidated 
was their discriminatory effects.115 Here the effects fell on black and 
white alike, according to the Court.116  
 Justice White, dissenting, responded that “[s]tate action predicat-
ed solely on opposition to a lawful court order to desegregate is a de-
nial of equal protection of the laws.”117 He questioned the “substantial 
evidence” credited by the majority that the pools were closed because 
they could not be operated economically if integrated.118 But for a 
court order to open the pools to all regardless of race, they would have 
remained open, he concluded; therefore, the decision to close them 
was motivated by opposition to integration and could not be squared 
with the Equal Protection Clause.119 
 Given Palmer v. Thompson’s emphasis on the need to prove effects 
and its skepticism about the ability or propriety of discerning the 
purpose or intent behind an official act, there is an irony in the 
Court’s decision a few years later in Washington v. Davis.120 Unsuc-
cessful applicants for positions on the District of Columbia police 
force claimed that the use of a qualifying exam for police recruits vio-
lated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment121 be-
cause it had a disproportionate impact on African-American appli-
cants.122 The court of appeals concluded that such a disparate impact 
was sufficient to state a claim for race discrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment, regardless of the lack of discriminatory intent.123 
 Justice White, for the Court, reversed. “[O]ur cases,” he wrote, 
“have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, 
without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. There was evidence, however, that the pool transferred to the YMCA continued 
to operate on a segregated basis. Id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 265 (White, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 259. 
 119. Id. at 270-71. 
 120. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 121. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has an equal protection component that binds the federal 
government as the Equal Protection Clause does the states). 
 122. According to the Court, four times as many African-American applicants failed the 
test as did white applicants. Davis, 426 U.S. at 237. 
 123. Id. 
                                                                                                                  
2014]  ANTI-ANTI-EVASION 413 
 
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.”124 To the contrary, the Court’s cases, he argued, 
clearly demonstrated the need to show that official action was moti-
vated by an intent to discriminate,125 either by reference to express 
language in a statute, or by inference from “the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another.”126 The Court explained away 
Palmer v. Thompson’s opposite claim—that invidious purpose could 
never form the basis for invalidating official acts—by explaining that 
in that case the Court 
[a]ccept[ed] the finding that the pools were closed to avoid violence 
and economic loss . . . [and] rejected the argument that the aban-
donment of this service was inconsistent with the outstanding de-
segregation decree and that the otherwise seemingly permissible 
ends served by the ordinance could be impeached by demonstrat-
ing that racially invidious motivations had prompted the city 
council’s action.127 
 Were disparate impact sufficient to invalidate a law, the Court 
worried, such a holding “would raise serious questions about, and 
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regu-
latory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the 
poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.”128 The 
Court concluded that nothing about the decision to use a screening 
test or its administration indicated an intent to discriminate against 
African-American applicants—indeed, it found that the District of 
Columbia had gone out of its way to encourage African Americans to 
apply for positions on the police force.129 
 The Court had occasion again to consider the requirement for    
discriminatory intent the next term in Village of Arlington Heights    
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.130 In that case, the Court 
considered a local zoning decision to prohibit a multi-family housing 
development, which the plaintiffs alleged had a racially dispropor-
tionate impact.131 The majority reiterated that “[p]roof of racially    
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation         
of the Equal Protection Clause.”132 It then concluded that the evidence 
 124. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original). 
 125. Id. at 239-42. 
 126. Id. at 242. 
 127. Id. at 242-43. 
 128. Id. at 248. 
 129. Id. at 245-47. 
 130. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 131. Id. at 255-60. 
 132. Id. at 265. 
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showed that city officials, in denying the petition to rezone, “focused 
almost exclusively on the zoning aspects” of the planned housing   
project, rather than on the probable racial composition of the         
project’s ultimate residents.133 As such, the plaintiffs could not show 
that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the city’s    
decision, ending the constitutional inquiry and leaving the lower 
court’s conclusion of discriminatory effect “without independent    
constitutional significance.”134 
 4.   Abortion Funding 
 Following Roe v. Wade,135 in which the Court held that a woman’s 
choice to terminate her pregnancy before the third trimester was a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, states 
and the federal government restricted conditions under which abor-
tions would be subsidized by the government. The Court upheld Con-
necticut’s decision to cover only “medically necessary” abortions—
while funding childbirth—under its Medicaid program in Maher v. 
Roe.136 The respondents maintained that the refusal to subsidize 
abortion constituted a denial of the right. The Court disagreed. Jus-
tice Powell wrote that Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases in which 
regulations of abortion were invalidated “recognize a constitutionally 
protected interest ‘in making certain kinds of important decisions’ 
free from governmental compulsion.”137 By contrast, 
[t]he Connecticut regulation places no obstacles—absolute or oth-
erwise—in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion. An indigent 
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a con-
sequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues 
as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she de-
sires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alter-
native, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has im-
posed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already 
there. The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cas-
es, perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is nei-
ther created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.138 
 The dissent accused the majority of “distressing insensitivity” to 
the plight of poor women who “will feel they have no choice but to 
carry their pregnancies to term because the State will pay for the as-
sociated medical services, even though they would have chosen to 
 133. Id. at 270. 
 134. Id. at 270-71. 
 135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 136. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 137. Id. at 473. 
 138. Id. at 474. 
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have abortions if the State had also provided funds for that proce-
dure.”139 The decision, the dissent alleged, “seriously erodes the prin-
ciples that Roe . . . announced to guide the determination of what 
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental 
right . . . .”140 Justice Brennan also argued that the decision was in-
consistent with cases involving other fundamental rights, in which 
the Court had “found . . . infringements . . . not limited to outright 
denials of those rights,”141 but also cases in which the government im-
posed “restraints that make exercise of those rights more difficult.”142 
 At the federal level, the “Hyde Amendment” prohibited the use of 
federal funds to pay for abortions unless the life of the woman was in 
danger, or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.143 This exclu-
sion was challenged in Harris v. McRae; as in Maher, the Court up-
held the exclusions, finding that failing to subsidize abortion did not 
deprive women of the right to an abortion. For the Court, Justice Pot-
ter Stewart wrote that the Hyde Amendment, like Connecticut’s regu-
lations, “place[d] no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman 
who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of un-
equal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encour-
ages alternative activity deemed in the public interest.”144 Indigency, 
which the government did not create, produced the inability to pro-
cure an abortion for poor women. If there were a right to subsidized 
abortion, then other rights recognized by the Court—the right to use 
contraceptives or send children to private schools—could likewise be 
read to require government subsidies to the poor to enable them 
meaningfully to enjoy those rights.145 That result “would mark a dras-
tic change in our understanding of the Constitution,” wrote Stewart.146 
IV.   WHY THE COURT DECLINES TO CREATE ANTI-EVASION DOCTRINES 
 The cases described in Part III establish that the Court regularly 
declines invitations by parties to create AEDs in a substantial num-
ber of cases involving structures and powers as well as civil liberties. 
But simply establishing the fact does not answer the more important 
 139. Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 484. 
 141. Id. at 487. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). 
 144. Id. at 315. 
 145. Id. at 317-18. 
 146. Id. at 318. Justice Brennan dissented, rehearsing his earlier complaints about the 
majority’s “failure to acknowledge that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of 
governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effec-
tively as can an outright denial of those rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions.” 
Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
                                                                                                                  
416  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:397 
 
question: Why does the Court create AEDs in some areas but not in 
others? Why will the Court treat discriminatory effects against inter-
state commerce as sufficient to invalidate state or local action, but not 
when official action has a disparate impact on one racial group?147 
Why did the Court create the regulatory takings doctrine that pre-
vents de facto takings effected by legislation, while permitting Con-
gress to evade the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” restriction by 
continuously extending the length of copyright?148 
 Because a primary function of AEDs is to optimize constitutional 
principles and to prevent officials from observing the form of doctrinal 
rules at the expense of substance, it is tempting to conclude that in 
the cases discussed above, the Court simply isn’t interested in opti-
mizing the particular constitutional principles at issue. It is also 
tempting to throw up one’s hands and conclude that the Court will 
create AEDs when it creates them, and will not create them when it 
does not.  
 In this Part, however, we hope to avoid either cynicism or tautolo-
gy in our examination of this question. A close reading of the Court’s 
reasoning in cases rejecting calls for AEDs reveals that the Court en-
gages in anti-anti-evasion for one or more related reasons: (1) con-
cerns about institutional competence expressed as a felt need for def-
erence to another branch to permit the allegedly evasive activity; (2) a 
perceived distinction between conduct proscribed by the Constitution 
and the official action alleged to evade that proscription; (3) a reluc-
tance to frame AEDs based on impermissible purpose alone; and (4) 
concerns about the consequences of over-enforcement of a constitu-
tional principle through the use of AEDs. We find these reasons in-
complete, however, because similar claims could be made about cases 
in which the Court does create AEDs. In Part V, we hypothesize that 
cases in which the Court declines to create AEDs share common 
characteristics that, though not remarked upon by the Court, explain 
its decision to engage in anti-anti-evasion. Here, however, we address 
the Court’s stated reasons for such a decision. 
A.   Institutional Competence and Deference 
 Perhaps the most common reason articulated by the Court for de-
clining to create an AED is that doing so will upset traditional bal-
ance of power arrangements or otherwise extend the judicial function 
beyond its proper boundaries. In several of the cases described above, 
the Court expressed a sense that either it ought to defer to historic 
 147. Compare Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1789-90, with supra notes 110-34 and 
accompanying text. 
 148. Compare Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1792-93, with supra notes 25-34 and 
accompanying text. 
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practice permitting the alleged evasion or it lacked the institutional 
competence to design an appropriate AED. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, for 
example, the Court deferred both to historic practice retroactively ex-
tending the time for existing copyrights and to Congress’s decision to 
do so in that case. Noting that the statute at issue “reflects judgments 
of a kind Congress typically makes,”149 the majority “stressed . . . that 
it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pur-
sue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”150 
 The Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Trans-
it Authority provides another example of this rationale. In overruling 
its prior decision that the FLSA could not apply to state and local 
government employers, the Court noted that applying that rule had 
required difficult line drawing concerning the nature of the federal 
system, as well as about what functions and services government was 
supposed to provide. Recognizing that it was “an open question how 
well equipped” judicial officers are to make these determinations, the 
Court explained its reluctance to interject the judiciary into matters 
of public policy: “Any rule of state immunity that looks to the ‘tradi-
tional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental functions in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.”151 
Overruling its prior decisions to the contrary was required, the Court 
went on, by the “[d]ue respect . . . [the Court owed to] the reach of 
congressional power within the federal system.”152 
 Similar statements can be found throughout the Court’s anti-anti-
evasion opinions.153 The refusal to consider a “taxes-as-takings” AED, 
for example, is grounded in an unwillingness or inability to engage in 
the line drawing necessary to distinguish “true” taxes from confisca-
tory taxes that really are takings.154 In both Mueller v. Allen and 
 149. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003). 
 150. Id. at 212. 
 151. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1985). 
 152. Id. at 557. 
 153. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(“Probably few persons, prior to this case, would have imagined that cities could be forced 
by five lifetime judges to construct or refurbish swimming pools which they chose not to 
operate for any reason, sound or unsound.”); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 
587-88 (1937) (“A legislature has a wide range of choice in classifying and limiting the sub-
jects of taxation. . . . Such questions of fiscal policy will not be answered by a court.”). 
 154. See City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 376 (1974): 
This approach would demand not only that the judiciary undertake to separate 
those taxes that are too burdensome from those that are not, but also would re-
quire judicial oversight of the terms and circumstances under which the gov-
ernment or its tax-exempt instrumentalities may undertake to compete with 
the private sector. The clear teaching of prior cases is that this is not a task 
that the Due Process Clause demands of or permits to the judiciary. We are not 
now inclined to chart a different course. 
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Washington v. Davis, the Court was equally wary of its ability to fash-
ion rules inferring constitutional impermissibility from statistical ev-
idence of actual benefit or burden, as well as the propriety of courts 
even engaging in that exercise.155 And in the abortion funding cases, 
the Court emphasized that the legislature, and not the judiciary, was 
the proper forum for balancing the sensitive and competing policy in-
terests that these cases typically involve.156 
B.   Constitutionally Significant Distinctions 
 Another common reason for declining to create an AED is that the 
complained-of action, to the Court, is not really evasion at all. The 
Court will point to something analytically distinctive about the action 
that renders it not merely an observance of form and disregard of the 
substance of a constitutional principle. Nowhere is this clearer than 
the Court’s repeated refusal to treat tax expenditures as direct spend-
ing, either for purposes of the DCCD or, more recently, in its contin-
ued narrowing of the Flast v. Cohen exception to the bar on taxpayer 
standing. In DCCD cases, the Court repeatedly has suggested that 
“there is a constitutionally significant difference between subsidies 
and tax exemptions.”157 Likewise, in the context of taxpayer standing, 
the Court has emphasized a constitutional distinction between tax 
credits and direct expenditures, even though the economic conse-
quences of the two devices may be similar.158 These distinctions, for 
the Court, make a genuine difference that influences the ultimate 
make-up of constitutional doctrine. 
 In similar fashion, the Court has consistently regarded the deci-
sion not to subsidize a particular activity—abortion, for example—as 
being fundamentally different than a legislative decision to place a 
 155. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) (“Such an approach would scarcely 
provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled 
standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated.”); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (explaining that such a rule would involve “a more probing judi-
cial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and 
executives than is appropriate under the Constitution”). 
 156. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (explaining that public funding of 
abortion is a decision “entrusted under the Constitution to Congress, not the courts,” and 
that “[i]t is not the mission of this Court or any other to decide whether the balance of 
competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise social policy”); Maher v. Roe, 
432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (“The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic 
abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply 
divided. . . . [T]he appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.”). 
 157. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590 (1997); 
see also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (distinguishing a “pure 
subsidy,” which “ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce,” from the offending 
tax expenditure under consideration); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
278 (1988) (“Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the 
DCCD]; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.”). 
 158. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011). 
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(non-financial) obstacle in the path of a woman who wishes to termi-
nate her pregnancy.159 The inability to secure an unsubsidized abor-
tion is caused not by state action, but rather because of the poverty 
itself. Again, that distinction carries a real difference, according to 
the Court—the state presumably did not place the woman in a state 
of indigency and thus cannot be said to be imposing the restriction or 
proscription. Under these circumstances, the indigent woman is left 
“with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain 
a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had 
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all.”160  
 Consider also the different ways that the Court treats purpose 
tests. We will address this in more detail below, but here it suffices to 
note that the Court treats claims of improper motive as meaningfully 
different depending on the nature of the motive in question. Explain-
ing its requirement for proof of racially discriminatory intent in the 
equal protection context, for example, the Court distinguished be-
tween racial animus and other legislative motivations: 
Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body    
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely 
by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 
“dominant” or “primary” one. In fact, it is because legislators     
and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numer-
ous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing 
the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness     
or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just another   
competing consideration.161 
Even though the Court often views allegations of improper motive 
with suspicion, racial motivation is sufficiently different that it war-
rants distinctive constitutional treatment.162 
 Finally, the Court’s insistence in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. 
that a tax on use is not the same as a tariff raising the costs of impor-
tation into a state,163 and its differentiation in Sabri v. United States 
between federal spending as a trigger to punish individual conduct 
and federal spending as a means of overpowering state public policy 
choices,164 provide yet more examples of the Court finding constitu-
tionally significant distinctions that preclude the crafting of an AED. 
 159. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. 
 160. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317. 
 161. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(footnote omitted). 
 162. See id. at 265-66.   
 163. 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937). 
 164. 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004). 
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C.   Skepticism About Purpose 
 As hinted at in the prior Part, the Court has displayed an ambiva-
lent relationship with purpose tests throughout the years. On the one 
hand, it frequently uses purpose or intent tests to flush out unconsti-
tutional actions that were somehow concealed.165 But on the other, 
the Court is often wary of relying on impermissible purpose alone to    
invalidate official action, as Palmer v. Thompson, Eldred, and 
Henneford showed.166 The Court’s ambivalence stems from, as critics 
have argued, a reluctance to accuse another branch of legislating      
in bad faith, the difficulty in assigning motive or intent to a          
multimember body, the differences between the judicial and legisla-
tive functions, and the possibility that offending legislation will simp-
ly be reenacted after somehow purging itself of the effects of the    
malign purpose.167  
 It is interesting, then, that Washington v. Davis required a show-
ing of discriminatory intent to prove a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. In addition to its conviction that racial motivation is sig-
nificantly distinct from other types of intent,168 the Court seemed con-
cerned that holding discrimination-in-effect to be sufficient for invali-
dating official action would result in a flood of litigation calling into 
question innumerable federal and state policies.169 
D.   Consequentialism and the Failure to Create AEDs 
 Finally, the Court expresses a reluctance to create AEDs when it 
believes the consequences of adopting a particular AED will destabi-
lize or dramatically alter constitutional doctrine. The Court worried 
in Davis, for example, that permitting disparate impact claims for 
race discrimination might end up permitting race to serve as a proxy 
for wealth, thus calling into question scores of laws that adversely 
affect minority groups whose members tend to be less wealthy.170 
Similar concerns—that to equate a refusal to subsidize a right was 
tantamount to infringing that same right—led the Court to reject the 
 165. See Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1788-93 (describing purpose and effects 
tests as types of AEDs). See generally Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Discriminatory 
Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the assessment of legis-
lative purpose in the practice of judicial review). 
 166. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200 (2003); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 
U.S. 217, 224 (1971); Henneford, 300 U.S. at 586. 
 167. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225. 
 168. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66; supra text accompanying note 161. 
 169. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-43, 248 (1976); supra text accompany-
ing notes 124-28. 
 170. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (explaining that such a rule “would be far reaching and 
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, 
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes”). 
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creation of an AED in the abortion funding cases. The Justices were 
concerned that so holding would constitutionalize vast swaths of the 
welfare state—at least those parts that impacted constitutional 
rights. That, in turn, would convert constitutional guarantees from 
“negative” liberties into positive ones, a move that was too radical for 
the Court.171 “ ‘[T]he Constitution,’ ” the Court explained in Maher, 
“ ‘does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.’ ”172 
 Considerations about disturbing existing constitutional frame-
works also played a significant role in the Court’s decision in Garcia. 
In overruling the AED previously created in Usery, the Court sug-
gested that its prior rule ran the risk of upsetting the constitutional 
balance between federal and state authority. Noting that “the sover-
eignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself,”173 the major-
ity explained that “State sovereign interests . . . are more properly 
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed-
eral system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”174 
*** 
 Implicit in the Court’s decision not to create AEDs is its judgment 
that optimizing the enforcement of constitutional values—what we 
described as the main benefit of AEDs175—is not the Court’s raison 
d’être in all constitutional cases. Other values—institutional compe-
tence, deference to past practice, separation of powers concerns—
weigh on the Court’s implementation of constitutional provisions. 
And yet, to us, the Court’s articulated reasons for not creating AEDs 
don’t tell the whole story. Many of the reasons discussed above are 
arguably present in cases in which the Court created or applied 
AEDs. Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, have long com-
plained that judicial enforcement of the DCCD—especially its balanc-
ing prong—is beyond the institutional competence of the judiciary.176 
 171. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (“To hold otherwise would mark a 
drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution.”); cf. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 228 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (“To find an equal protection issue in every closing of public 
swimming pools, tennis courts, or golf courses would distort beyond reason the meaning of 
[the Equal Protection Clause]” and would “constitutionally ‘lock[] in’ the public sponsor so 
that [the service or facility] may not be dropped . . . .”). 
 172. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 
74 (1972)). 
 173. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985). 
 174. Id. at 552. 
 175. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1797. 
 176. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 351 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (complaining that the DCCD reflects only the 
policy preferences of majorities in particular cases, urging the doctrine’s total abandon-
ment); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (complaining that balancing in DCCD cases requires comparing incommen-
surable values; requiring courts to “judg[e] whether a particular line is longer than a par-
ticular rock is heavy”).  
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Academic and judicial critics of the Court’s regulatory takings cases 
have complained that it ignores both historical precedent and salient 
differences between regulation and exercises of eminent domain.177 
And lamenting the consequences of over-enforcing constitutional 
principles through the use of AEDs is a familiar trope in dissenting 
opinions.178 The question is still left hanging: What makes the Court 
less inclined to create AEDs in certain cases? Close inspection of the 
cases discussed above reveals a common thread that, we argue in 
Part V, explains the Court’s reluctance to create AEDs. 
V.   AEDS AND ANTI-ANTI-EVASION:  
TOWARD A THEORY OF UNDER-ENFORCEMENT 
 As we recognized previously, AEDs tend to take the form of stand-
ards backstopping previously created rules to implement constitu-
tional principles. Their function is prophylactic—they make it more 
difficult for officials to elevate form over substance, thereby frustrat-
ing covert violations of the Constitution. AEDs, then, over-enforce 
certain provisions. As we have pointed out in this Article, however, 
the Court doesn’t always create AEDs. Why? 
 In reviewing the cases in which the Court has declined to create 
an AED, we are struck by a common thread: each deals to some ex-
tent either with governmental decisions to tax or spend or with the 
provision of subsidized goods or services. This characteristic is obvi-
ous in a number of the decisions discussed in Part III. South Dakota 
v. Dole and Sabri v. United States, for example, directly concern con-
gressional spending authority. In similar fashion, the taxes-as-
takings cases straightforwardly present issues about the govern-
ment’s power to tax. The DCCD cases involve either taxes or subsi-
dies, as do the Establishment Clause and abortion funding cases. 
 177. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036-61 (1992) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Mean-
ing of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000).  
 178. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 
314 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Criticizing the majority’s extension of the state action 
doctrine, Justice Thomas complained that 
if the majority’s new entwinement test develops in future years, it could affect 
many organizations that foster activities, enforce rules, and sponsor extracur-
ricular competition among high schools—not just in athletics, but in such di-
verse areas as agriculture, mathematics, music, marching bands, forensics, and 
cheerleading. Indeed, this entwinement test may extend to other organizations 
that are composed of, or controlled by, public officials or public entities, such as 
firefighters, policemen, teachers, cities, or counties. 
Id. at 314-15; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing con-
cern that “the Court’s new [takings] policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the 
present case”).  
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 Skeptical readers, however, might wonder about our characteriza-
tion of the other cases. What about Eldred? Washington v. Davis? Ar-
lington Heights? Palmer v. Thompson? What do race discrimination 
cases and a case about the Copyright Clause have to do with taxing 
and spending decisions? First, consider that “[a] copyright enables its 
owner to exclude competition from copiers, and so if there are no good 
substitutes for his work he will obtain a monopoly profit . . . by being 
able to charge a price in excess of his marginal cost (the cost of mak-
ing an additional copy).”179 This monopoly is granted by the govern-
ment and results in a subsidy—in the form of the monopoly profits—
from consumers of copyrighted works to their producers. The decision 
whether and to what extent to grant such privileges to a select group 
strikes us as consistent with other, more straightforward decisions to 
tax or spend or subsidize certain goods and services.  
 Washington v. Davis is a little different. On the surface, there is 
no connection between a disparate impact race discrimination claim 
and taxing and spending decisions. But in the opinion, the Court very 
quickly tumbled to the fact that race was often a proxy for wealth, 
and that claims of race discrimination could be lodged against laws 
that really discriminate on the basis of wealth. That result, the Court 
pointed out, “would raise serious questions about, and perhaps inval-
idate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and 
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to 
the average black than to the more affluent white.”180 The zoning 
regulations at issue in Arlington Heights seem to fall squarely within 
the ambit of this concern, and scholars have noted that such regula-
tions often have the economic effect of subsidizing some portion of the 
population at the expense of others.181 Invalidating these regulations 
without evidence of an invidious purpose, the Court seemed to sug-
gest, would be tantamount to deciding if and how land use subsidies 
should be meted out, a decision better left to the political branches. 
Similarly, the Palmer majority worried about “five lifetime judges” 
forcing cities “to construct or refurbish swimming pools which they 
choose not to operate for any reason, sound or unsound.”182 
 More important than what subjects the cases involve, though, is 
why these subjects seem to matter. What makes the Court more like-
ly to reject anti-evasion arguments in these types of cases as opposed 
to others? Though our conclusions here are tentative, our working 
 179. Richard A. Posner, The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act: 
Economics, Politics, Law, and Judicial Technique in Eldred v Ashcroft, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 
143, 146. 
 180. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
 181. See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclu-
sionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 31-32 (1996). 
 182. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971). 
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hypothesis is that the Court—at least implicitly, though sometimes 
explicitly—believes that there are robust political protections in 
these cases that sufficiently police the constitutional boundaries and 
prevent governmental overreaching. We stress that the Court’s 
judgment here is a comparative one. It is evident that sometimes the 
political process does not monitor the boundaries effectively. The 
point is that, in the Court’s judgment, it does so most of the time bet-
ter than a court would be able to do. Or, put differently, the costs of 
optimization through the use of AEDs (which would probably result 
in some over-enforcement of constitutional norms) are greater than the 
risk of under-enforcement occasioned by the lack of an available AED. 
 Consider again the repeated references in the Court’s opinions to 
the limits of its own institutional competence. These statements not 
only suggest that the Court perceives questions regarding optimal 
levels of taxing and spending to be outside its purview, but they also 
carry the additional message that the policing of those limits lies 
with other bodies that can discharge that function better than the 
judiciary. By ceding the enforcement role to these other institutions, 
moreover, the Court signals its confidence that the protections provid-
ed by the political processes are sufficient to prevent grave abuses.183   
 Sometimes, as in Garcia, the Court makes this point explicitly: 
“[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is 
that inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that 
our system provides through state participation in federal govern-
mental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly 
burden the States will not be promulgated.”184 More typically, the 
Court implies it, as it did in Eldred’s recounting of the various inter-
ests that participated in the passage of the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act,185 followed by its conclusion that the retroactive application 
of the term extension was a “rational enactment” reflecting “congres-
sional determinations and policy judgments” that the Court refused 
to second-guess.186 The majority chided Justice Breyer for his sugges-
tion that a new three-part test be applied to the Act, commenting 
that “ ‘it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has la-
 183. Cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1992) (noting, in a tax case, that “the 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident deci-
sions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is 
generally unwarranted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 184. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985); see also id. 
at 552-53 (discussing “[t]he effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving . . . 
States’ interests”); id. at 554 (“[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is 
one of process rather than one of result.”). 
 185. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 & nn.11-13, 207 nn.14-15 (2003). 
 186. Id. at 208. 
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bored to achieve.’ ”187 One hears a similar admonition in the Court’s 
refusal to allow the taxpayers standing to sue over the tax expendi-
tures in Winn. “Few exercises of the judicial power,” the Court con-
cluded, “are more likely to undermine public confidence in the neu-
trality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court 
in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to 
invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them.”188 
There is a forum for disputes such as these, the Court seems to say; it 
isn’t a judicial one, but is one that can be counted upon to do a passa-
ble job preventing abuses. “We should not forget,” the Court cau-
tioned in Maher v. Roe, “that ‘legislatures are ultimate guardians of 
the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as 
the courts.’ ”189 
 By contrast, cases in which the Court has created AEDs feature 
clues that the Court is worried that the process protections to moni-
tor official abuse either do not exist or could be expected to severely 
underperform relative to judicial enforcement. For example, regula-
tory takings opinions, an area in which the Court routinely employs 
AEDs,190 often express doubt that process protections are robust 
enough to uphold the constitutional principle enshrined in the Tak-
ings Clause. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,191 which many con-
sider to be the genesis of the Court’s regulatory takings doctrine, Jus-
tice Holmes directly called into question the efficacy of political safe-
guards when it comes to protecting private property from public en-
croachment. Noting that the Takings Clause presupposes the exist-
ence of a public purpose, he pointed out that it nevertheless requires 
the payment of just compensation to the property owner, regardless 
of how important the public purpose may be.192 “When this seemingly 
absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power,” he 
continued, “the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private property disap-
pears.”193 More recently, the Court has made clear that its regulatory 
takings jurisprudence is grounded in the idea of proper burden dis-
tribution, “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
 187. Id. at 205 n.10 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)). 
 188. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011). 
 189. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (quoting Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. 
May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)). 
 190. See Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1792-93 (discussing regulatory takings doc-
trine as example of AED); see also id. at 1795 (noting that “the Court’s entire regulatory 
takings jurisprudence serves as an elaborate body of AEDs”). 
 191. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 192. Id. at 415. 
 193. Id. 
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borne by the public as a whole.”194 Implicit in this justification is the 
notion that the political process cannot be trusted fairly to apportion 
public burdens where “other people’s” property is involved. As one 
state court has noted in applying the Supreme Court’s takings deci-
sions, it is “entirely possible that the government could ‘gang up’ on 
particular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents 
would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would 
otherwise bear were shifted to others.”195 
 The Court’s dormant Commerce Clause opinions frequently sound 
a similar theme. In explaining why the federal government was em-
powered to regulate interstate commerce, Justice Cardozo famously 
referred to the Confederation Era experience of “the mutual jeal-
ousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers 
and other economic retaliation” that suppressed competition among 
the states.196 The reason for the involvement of the Court in invali-
dating state laws that give in to the temptation to discriminate (as 
opposed to leaving matters for congressional regulation) is the sense 
that the offending state and local laws “are individually too petty, too 
diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard 
pressed with more urgent matters.”197 For the Court to stay its hand, 
Justice Robert Jackson later concluded, “would allow the states to 
establish the restraints and let commerce struggle for Congressional 
action to make it free.”198 
 The decision in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy further illus-
trates the point.199 Even though the tax in that case was facially neu-
tral, applying to in-state and out-of-state producers alike, the reve-
 194. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 195. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 
2004). The link between the Takings Clause and the Court’s takings decisions, on the one 
hand, and political process failure, on the other, has been noted by several scholars. See, 
e.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Develop-
ment Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833, 1863-65 (2010) (discussing 
process failure in context of land use exactions); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 855 
(1995) (positing that remedying process failure was original purpose of the Takings 
Clause); see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(relating takings protections to notions of political transparency and accountability). 
 196. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 197. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 198. Id. at 401. 
 199. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), which struck down a state 
taxing scheme under the DCCD, likewise illustrates that there is nothing inherently magi-
cal about taxing and spending decisions in and of themselves. Rather, it is the Court’s as-
sessment that these cases generally provide sufficient political protections that is the driv-
ing factor. In cases where that assessment is shown to be false, even with regard to tax and 
spend measures, the Court will intervene. 
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nues raised from the tax were distributed only to in-state businesses.200 
This feature caused the constitutional infirmity, and for the Court, 
the problem was rooted directly in the lack of political safeguards: 
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue 
here, are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on inter-
state commerce, in part because “[t]he existence of major in-state 
interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against 
legislative abuse.” However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is cou-
pled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s 
political processes can no longer be relied upon to prevent legisla-
tive abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would oth-
erwise lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.201 
The Court thus saw in the tax-plus-subsidy scheme a potential pro-
cess failure similar to the one articulated above in the context of reg-
ulatory takings. Given the incentives for in-state producers to “gang 
up” on their out-of-state counterparts, the political process would be 
unlikely to provide adequate protections, making judicial interven-
tion more necessary.202 
 Thus, it appears to us that the Court largely views the political 
process as typically better-equipped to safeguard constitutional    
principles in cases that involve taxing and spending decisions      
than in cases involving other types of regulation. Concomitantly,   
because of the existence of these process protections, the Court is 
more likely to decline the invitation to create an AED in the former 
cases as opposed to the latter. But where political safeguards are in-
adequate, even taxing and spending measures will come under 
heightened scrutiny. 
 A final piece of evidence in support of these conclusions is provid-
ed by the Court’s recent decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, which was 
handed down as we were finishing this Article. Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s opinion for the Court upholding the individual mandate did so 
not on Commerce Clause grounds, but on the ground that the pay-
ment incurred by individuals for not purchasing insurance was a 
 200. Id. at 188. 
 201. Id. at 200 (alteration in original) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)). 
 202. This, of course, raises the question why direct subsidies to in-state interests are 
constitutionally permissible when similar tax expenditures are not. Although full treat-
ment of that issue is beyond our scope, we note that several commentators have explained 
the difference on just the same terms we emphasize here—i.e., tax expenditures are less 
transparent than direct subsidies and, therefore, are less likely to be effectively monitored 
through the political process. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 37, at 984-86; J. Clifton Flem-
ing, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International 
Dimension, 27 VA. TAX. REV. 437, 481-83 (2008); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing 
Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 1016-17 (2011). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” 
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998) (arguing 
that the two devices should be treated as constitutionally equivalent in many cases). 
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permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power.203 Opponents of the 
mandate argued—and most courts agreed—that the “shared respon-
sibility payment” was in truth an unconstitutional “penalty,” not a 
valid use of Congress’s taxing power.204 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, suggesting that the mandated payment was not a pretextual 
imposition of an impermissible penalty, but a real tax.205  
 Throughout this portion of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts em-
phasized the protections built in to prevent abuses. He noted that, in 
addition to persons exempted from payment, the amount itself is 
capped: “for most Americans the amount due will be far less than the 
price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more.”206 Moreo-
ver, Congress “bar[red] the IRS from using several of its normal en-
forcement tools, such as criminal prosecutions and levies.”207 He also 
stressed that the Act need not be read to make the failure to pur-
chase insurance unlawful: “Neither the Act nor any other law attach-
es negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, be-
yond requiring a payment to the IRS.”208 Because an estimated four 
million people per year are expected to forgo insurance and make the 
payment, and because “Congress apparently regards such extensive 
failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable,” that “suggests that 
Congress did not think it was creating four million outlaws.”209 In 
short, for the majority, the political process that produced the man-
date incorporated safeguards against its abuse, and these legislative 
protections adequately policed the constitutional boundary demarcat-
ing a permissible tax from a pretextual one. As such, the Court ap-
parently saw little reason for further, judicially created precautions. 
 203. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (“The 
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not 
obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax.”). This portion of the 
Chief Justice’s opinion, Part III.C, was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, and thus constituted the opinion of the Court. 
 204. Though we did not discuss the taxing power in our earlier article, the tax/penalty 
distinction is suggestive of a pretext AED. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor 
Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922) (holding that Congress may not expand its power by 
labeling a severe penalty a “tax”); Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1780-84 (discussing 
pretext AEDs). 
 205. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (suggesting indicia of a tax is a functional inquiry; em-
phasizing “practical characteristics” of a tax: (1) whether it raised revenue without impos-
ing an excessive burden on the payer; (2) the presence or absence of a scienter requirement; 
and (3) which government agency possessed responsibility for collection); see also supra 
notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing refusal to create or apply AEDs because of 
the Court’s perception of constitutionally significant distinctions). 
 206. Id. at 2595-96. 
 207. Id. at 2580; see also id. at 2596 (noting that “the payment is collected solely by the 
IRS through the normal means of taxation—except that the Service is not allowed to use 
those means most suggestive of a punitive sanction” (emphasis in original)). 
 208. Id. at 2597. 
 209. Id. 
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 More support comes from Roberts’s discussion of the Medicaid ex-
pansion. Under the Act, Medicaid was dramatically expanded from 
requiring states “to cover only certain discrete categories of needy 
individuals—pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind, 
the elderly, and the disabled” to forcing them “to cover all individuals 
under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal 
poverty line” by 2014.210 The coverage, moreover, had to meet federal-
ly mandated minimum standards to enable individuals to comply 
with the mandate’s requirements. States that refused to comply with 
the mandated expansion lost all federal Medicaid funds.211 Seven 
Justices thought that this “gun to the head,”212 in the Chief Justice’s 
phrase, was unconstitutionally “coercive” and went beyond Con-
gress’s power to attach conditions to money that it offers to states.213 
 At first blush, the Court’s deployment of an “anti-coercion” AED in 
a spending matter would seem to create problems for our thesis.214 A 
close reading of the various opinions, however, tends to confirm our 
working hypothesis. The seven members of the Court who voted to 
invalidate the penalty for refusing to embrace Medicaid’s expansion 
on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally coercive were employ-
ing an AED previously suggested by the Dole Court, but one that had 
remained dormant. Consistent with our hypothesis, the Court aban-
doned its usual anti-anti-evasion position—even though this case in-
volved spending—because it perceived the typical political safeguards 
as absent or having been severely compromised. The Court thought 
that the dramatic expansion of Medicaid represented a change in the 
nature of the program, not merely a change in degree. When coupled 
with the threatened loss of all existing Medicaid funds, states could 
not realistically escape the federal yoke by simply declining the 
funds; they were presented with an all-or-nothing proposition. 
 Roberts’s opinion began by linking the anti-coercion rule for condi-
tional spending with the constitutional principle underlying the anti-
commandeering principle215: political accountability. “Permitting the 
 210. Id. at 2601. 
 211. Id. at 2603. 
 212. Id. at 2604 (“[T]he financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than 
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”). 
 213. Id. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2662 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“If the anticoercion rule does not apply in this 
case, then there is no such rule.”). 
 214. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s lack of inter-
est in articulating criteria for “coercive” spending conditions as an example of anti-anti-
evasion); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1783-84 (discussing Dole’s suggestion 
that spending conditions could be so onerous as to be coercive and, thus, unconstitutional, 
as a possible—if inchoate—AED). 
 215. The anti-commandeering principle prohibits the federal government from forcing 
state legislatures or executive branch officials to implement a federal program. Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal pro-
gram would threaten the political accountability key to our federal 
system,” Roberts wrote.216 He explained that accountability is not 
threatened when “a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept 
the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds. In such a situa-
tion, state officials can fairly be held politically accountable for choos-
ing to accept or refuse the federal offer.”217 Without that choice, how-
ever, “the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without ac-
countability”—indeed, the danger to the federal system is greater be-
cause “Congress can use [the spending] power to implement federal 
policy it could not impose directly under its enumerated powers.”218 
 When the process works as it should, it provides ample safeguards 
for state interests, and no judicial intervention is called for. “In the 
typical case,” the Chief Justice wrote, “we look to the States to defend 
their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not yielding’ 
to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the    
federal policies as their own.”219 He added wryly that “[t]he States are 
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act 
like it.”220 
 Two features of the Medicaid expansion, however, suggested that 
Congress had deliberately short-circuited these safeguards, warrant-
ing application of the anti-coercion AED. First, the Act dramatically 
expanded the scope of Medicaid both in terms of eligible persons as 
well as the menu of services states were required to offer.221 Second, a 
state’s refusal to participate in the expansion would not merely ren-
der it ineligible for new federal money, but would also forfeit all exist-
ing Medicaid funding.222 This “gun to the head” went far beyond 
South Dakota v. Dole’s223 withholding of five percent of highway 
funds.224 Because of the overall loss to a state’s budget, Chief Justice 
Roberts concluded, states had no real choice but to accept the expan-
sion of the program and the money that came with it, which was like-
ly the reason Congress designed the program as it did.225  
 216. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 217. Id. at 2602-03. 
 218. Id. at 2603. 
 219. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).   
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 2605-06. 
 222. Id. at 2603. 
 223. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 224. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 225. Id. at 2606 (“[T]he manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that 
while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it 
recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program.”); id. at 2665 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“If Congress had thought that States might 
actually refuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid, Congress would surely have 
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 This conclusion was echoed by the four Justices who authored the 
joint dissent. These Justices noted that while states may be theoreti-
cally free to refuse to embrace the expansion and forgo the money, 
[w]hen a heavy federal tax is levied to support a federal program 
that offers large grants to the States, States may, as a practical 
matter, be unable to refuse to participate in the federal program 
and to substitute a state alternative. . . . [W]ithdrawal would likely 
force the State to impose a huge tax increase on its residents, and 
this new state tax would come on top of the federal taxes already 
paid by residents to support subsidies to participating States.226 
For the dissenters, putting states to such a Hobson’s Choice “would 
permit Congress to dictate policy in areas traditionally governed 
primarily at the state or local level,”227 thus ending any semblance of 
state sovereignty in the federal system.228 Still, they cautioned that 
“courts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional [un-
der the anticoercion principle] unless the coercive nature of an offer 
is unmistakably clear.”229 
 What is striking about the discussion of both the mandate and the 
Medicaid expansion is the degree to which the Justices explicitly fo-
cused on the safeguards protecting individuals or states from con-
gressional abuse or overreaching.230 That the Court upheld the man-
date as a permissible tax, while finding the spending conditions    
impermissibly coercive, moreover, confirms our theory that what 
matters is not necessarily subject area, but the Court’s perception 
about the viability of robust political safeguards relative to judicially 
enforced ones.231 
devised a backup scheme so that the most vulnerable groups in our society, those previous-
ly eligible for Medicaid, would not be left out in the cold.”). 
 226. Id. at 2661-62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 227. Id. at 2662. 
 228. Id. at 2661. 
 229. Id. at 2662. 
 230. In similar fashion, Justice Ginsburg grounded her dissent from the Court’s ruling 
on the Medicaid expansion, at least in part, on the presence of adequate political safe-
guards. First, she rejected the notion that the Medicaid expansion threatened political 
accountability by muddying the waters as to which level of government—federal or state—
was ultimately responsible for Medicaid policy: “no such confusion is apparent in this case,” 
she wrote, “[because] Medicaid’s status as a federally funded, state-administered program 
is hardly hidden from view.” Id. at 2633 n.17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Additionally, she 
thought that the coercion analysis depended too heavily on the resolution of issues that 
must, and would, be resolved through the political process itself. See id. at 2641 (“The coer-
cion inquiry . . . appears to involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.”). 
Finally, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the political pressures that could be brought to bear on 
federal officials tasked with distributing money to the states, which would make those 
officials “all the more reluctant to cut off funds Congress has appropriated for a State’s 
needy citizens.” Id. at 2641 n.27. 
 231. We acknowledge at this point that our theory raises other questions. For example, 
assuming that our thesis is correct, is the Court’s approach normatively defensible? Should 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Despite the utility and ubiquity of AEDs in constitutional adjudi-
cation, there are notable examples where the Court declines to create 
or implement them. The Court’s own reasons for this decision include 
concerns about institutional competence and a need to defer to other 
branches, constitutionally significant distinctions between proscribed 
conduct and the actions alleged to be evasive, reluctance to ground 
AEDs in allegations of impermissible purpose, and concerns about the 
consequences that an AED might have on constitutional doctrine. 
While these reasons no doubt influence the Court’s decision whether 
or not to employ an AED, we think that they only tell part of the sto-
ry. The common thread in the anti-anti-evasion cases is that they typ-
ically, in one measure or another, involve taxing or spending deci-
sions or the provision of government-subsidized goods and services. 
Underlying this commonality, and of much greater significance, is the 
Court’s perception that these cases normally present a context where 
there are sturdy political safeguards that adequately monitor and en-
force the relevant constitutional principle better than would a judi-
cially crafted decision rule. Indeed, that the Court sometimes employs 
AEDs even in taxing and spending cases suggests that the driving 
factor is not the subject matter of the litigation but, rather, the 
Court’s evaluation of the strength of applicable process protections. 
 In this way, the actions of the Court when it employs anti-anti-
evasion confirm our earlier observation that when the Court chooses 
among decision rules, it is engaging in a form of risk regulation.232 
Just as AEDs suggest that the Court’s doctrinal formation is a type of 
risk assessment that seeks to achieve optimal (rather than maximal) 
precautions,233 the decision not to create an AED suggests that the 
Court believes adequate (even if incomplete) protections already exist 
without the need for additional decision rules. Moreover, the Court’s 
evaluation in anti-anti-evasion cases seems to be that extra judicial 
the existence of political safeguards be as influential to the development of constitutional 
doctrine as we suggest it is as a practical matter? Additionally, there are questions about 
what baselines the Court uses in determining whether political protections are sufficiently 
robust to avoid the creation of an AED, as well as whether those baselines are themselves 
justifiable. These are important questions, and we hope to take them up in future work. 
For now, however, we have decided to leave them unanswered—even at the risk of seeming 
dodgy or indolent. As we explain below, we hope that our work here provides a hypothesis 
that can be tested against future cases. Before delving into these more difficult questions, 
we would like further evidence that our hypothesis actually holds up. 
 232. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1813-15 (discussing risk regulation). We return 
to our doctrine-as-risk-regulation argument in a work currently in progress. Brannon P. 
Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Judicial Doctrine as Risk Regulation (unpublished work 
in progress) (drafts on file with authors). 
 233. Denning & Kent, supra note 1, at 1814. 
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protections ultimately would prove riskier than leaving the issue to 
the political safeguards that are already operating. 
 Assuming there is something to our hypothesis, what are its im-
plications? For us, it answers a question that had bothered us since 
the first article—why does the Court sometimes refuse to create 
AEDs? Beyond simply satisfying our own academic curiosity, we 
think that our articles, taken together, have broader implications as 
well. First, AEDs and the phenomenon of anti-anti-evasion drill down 
into possible reasons the Court has for adopting a set of decision 
rules or for choosing one set of decision rules over others that are 
available. Earlier work (usefully) described factors bearing on the 
Court’s choices in rather abstract terms.234 Here we have described a 
concrete choice often presented to the Court and offered a theory as 
to why it accepts or declines the opportunity to make one choice or 
another. This, we hope, contributes to the ongoing attempt to de-
scribe accurately what courts, in fact, do when they decide cases. At 
the very least, we have furnished a hypothesis that can be tested 
against future cases and their outcomes. 
 But we hope it is not too presumptuous of us to suggest that our 
thesis might be of value to judges and lawyers, not just academics. 
Our hypothesis suggests an additional reason, other than the ones 
given by the Court, driving its decisions whether or not to create 
AEDs. By identifying a factor that seems to be influencing the Justic-
es’ decisions—a factor that may have escaped the full awareness of 
the Justices themselves—we hope to encourage the Justices to be 
more intentional in selecting among available decision rules, and 
perhaps more transparent in the reasoning behind the adoption of 
one set over others.  
 If our hypothesis holds up, moreover, practicing lawyers might 
obviously benefit. If an advocate is asking the Court to create or 
adopt an AED, then she will know in advance the necessity of care-
fully crafting arguments that stress the inadequacy of existing politi-
cal safeguards and the need for an AED as a result.235 Conversely, 
those defending against claims that the Court should adopt or apply 
an AED might stress not only the presence of one or more of the fac-
tors to which the Court regularly avers when it engages in anti-anti-
evasion, but might also stress any political safeguards that render an 
AED unnecessary, if not pernicious. 
  
 234. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 2, at 92-96; see also KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE 
MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 26-32 (2006). 
 235. In like fashion, our hypothetical advocate will, we hope, also know what argu-
ments not to make. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s re-
luctance to create AEDs solely on the basis of alleged improper governmental purpose). 
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